Difference between revisions of "Belgian ePassport"

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Back to [[Belgian eGov]]
  
Back to [[Belgian eGov]]
 
==Belgian ePassports==
  
==Belgian ePassports==
  +
See also the general [[ePassport]] page
 
===Characteristics===
  
===Characteristics===
 
* [https://www.checkdoc.be/CheckDoc/index.jsp?currenPage=checkdocument.jsp&choice=checkSecurity&iconDB=02&specific_document=1115&checksecurity_level=2&id_menu=0012 Current versions demo]
  
* [https://www.checkdoc.be/CheckDoc/index.jsp?currenPage=checkdocument.jsp&choice=checkSecurity&iconDB=02&specific_document=1115&checksecurity_level=2&id_menu=0012 Current versions demo]
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* http://www.theregister.co.uk/2007/06/10/belgian_epassport_flaws/
  
* http://www.theregister.co.uk/2007/06/10/belgian_epassport_flaws/
 
* http://www.dice.ucl.ac.be/crypto/passport/index.html
  
* http://www.dice.ucl.ac.be/crypto/passport/index.html
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==RFID-enabled Passports==
  
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===ICAO standards===
  
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* [http://www.icao.int/mrtd/download/technical.cfm ICAO MRTD]
  
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* [http://www.hasbrouck.org/documents/ICAO9303-pt1-vol1.pdf ICAO9303-pt1-vol1.pdf]
  
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** [http://74.125.77.132/search?q=cache:jCSYw4YD9OIJ:www.hasbrouck.org/documents/ICAO9303-pt1-vol1.pdf html]
  
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* [http://www.hasbrouck.org/documents/ICAO9303-pt1-vol2.pdf ICAO9303-pt1-vol2.pdf]
  
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** [http://74.125.77.132/search?q=cache:dbnXg_0wfxkJ:hasbrouck.org/documents/ICAO9303-pt1-vol2.pdf html]
  
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* [http://www.hasbrouck.org/documents/ICAO9303-pt3.pdf ICAO9303-pt3.pdf]
  
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** [http://74.125.77.132/search?q=cache:vWDRlnA6feQJ:www.hasbrouck.org/documents/ICAO9303-pt3.pdf html]
  
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* [http://www2.icao.int/en/MRTD/Downloads/Supplements%20to%20Doc%209303/Supplement%20to%20ICAO%20Doc%209303%20-%20Release%207.pdf Supplement to ICAO Doc 9303 - Release_7]
  
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* [http://www.europeanbiometrics.info/images/resources/22_965_file.pdf LDS 1.7]
  
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* Others:
  
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** [http://www.bsi.bund.de/english/publications/techguidelines/tr03110/TR-03110_v200.pdf Advanced Security Mechanisms for Machine Readable Travel Documents] by BSI
  
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===Certificates===
  
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* CSCA certificate (Country Signing CA certificate)
 
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**is typically valid for their period of intended use + period of validity of the issued passports + 3 months (e.g. 5+10+0.25) and renewed after their period of intended use (e.g. 5 years).
  
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**is used to verify the DS certificate
  
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* DS certificate (Document Signer certificate)
  
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** is typically valid for the period of validity of the passport itself + 3 months and renewed after their period of intended use (3 months). (e.g. 10+0.25)
  
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** is used to verify the integrity of the EF_DG* files of the passport through their hashes signed in EF_SOD
  
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** is optionally present in the EF_SOD file of the passport (mandated by US-VISIT & by EU I think)
  
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* SOD (Document Security Object)
  
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** RFC3369 CMS Signed Data Structure, signed by the Document Signer (DS).
  
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** Carries the hashed LDS Data Groups.
  
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** Stored in the MRTD’s chip.
  
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** MAY carry the Document Signer Certificate
  
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* AA (Active Authentication) keys
  
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** private key stored in the chip
  
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** public key available in EF_DG15, whom hash key is signed in SOD by DS
  
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As per epassport2008 there are several certificates for the full EAC solution:
  
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Element File name
  
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CSCA certificate - name NN_CSCA.der (.der, .cer)
  
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DS certificate NN_DS (.der, .cer) preferably included in the ePassport chip
  
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CVCA certificate NN_CVCA.cvcert (minimal validity at least 2 month)
  
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CVCA private key under PKCS#8 format NN_CVCA.pkcs8
  
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DV certificate NN_DVCA.cvcert (effective date like CVCA certificate)
  
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IS certificate NN_IS.cvcert (effective date like CVCA certificate)
  
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IS private key under PKCS#8 format NN_IS.pkcs8
  
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===CSCA certificates===
  
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* see http://jmrtd.org/csca.shtml
  
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* [http://www2.icao.int/en/MRTD/Pages/icaoPKD.aspx ICAO PKD]
  
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* [https://pkddownloadsg.icao.int/ICAO/pkdLDIFDownload.jsp ICAO PKD LDIF download]
  
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Stupid script to see what are the country certificates there (there are also CRLs):
  
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<source lang=bash>
  
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#!/bin/bash
 
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rm xx*
  
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csplit pkd.000033.ldif '%userCertif%' '/^userCertif/' '{*}'
  
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for i in xx*; do
  
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cat $i |sed '1s/^.*:://;/:/,/qwerty/d' |openssl base64 -d|openssl x509 -inform der -out $i.pem -outform pem
  
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cat $i |sed '1s/^.*:://;/:/,/qwerty/d' |openssl base64 -d|openssl x509 -inform der -text -noout > $i.txt
  
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test $? -eq 0 && rm $i
  
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done
  
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</source>
  
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===Verifying a passport===
  
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Example to verify a French passport:
  
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# Get France CSCA certificate: hum you should get country certificates from a trusted source ;-)
  
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wget -O - http://jmrtd.org/csca/fr.cer |openssl x509 -inform der -outform pem -out fr.PEM
  
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# EF_SOD certificate should have been extracted by RFIDIOt, if not:
  
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tail -c+5 EF_SOD.BIN | openssl pkcs7 -inform DER -outform PEM -out EF_SOD.PEM
  
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# Verify DS certificate stored in the passport with country CSCA certificate:
  
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openssl pkcs7 -in EF_SOD.PEM -print_certs -outform PEM |openssl verify -CAfile fr.PEM
  
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# you should get back a OK:
  
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stdin: OK
  
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# Verify SOD is well signed by DS, how?
  
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# Verify files hashes are those signed in SOD
  
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# Active authentication, verify the passport owns the private key of cert in DG15, how?
  
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Moreover to be perfect, we should also check CSCA and DS against CRLs supposedly available at ICAO PKD.
  
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====Active Authentication====
  
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from http://www.aph.gov.au/Senate/committee/legcon_ctte/estimates/add_0506/ag/qon_91att_2.pdf
  
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<br>A4.2. Active Authentication Mechanism
  
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<br>Active Authentication is performed using the ISO7816 INTERAL AUTHENTICATE command. The input is a nonce (RND.IFD) that MUST be 8 bytes. The ICC computes a signature, when an integer factorization based mechanism is used, according to ISO9796-2 Digital Signature scheme 1 ([R17], ISO/IEC 9796-2, Information Technology – Security Techniques – Digital Signature Schemes giving message recovery – Part 2: Integer factorisation based mechanisms, 2002.).
  
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<br>M MUST consist of M1 and M2, where M1 MUST be a nonce of length c – 4 bits and M2 is RND.IFD.
  
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<br>The trailer option 1 MUST be used in case of SHA-1, if not SHA-1 then option 2 MUST be used.
  
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<br>The result of the signature computation MUST be signature 3 without the non-recoverable message part M2.
  
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<br>In more detail, IFD (inspection system) and ICC (MRTD’s chip) perform the following steps:
  
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<br>1) The IFD generates a nonce RND.IFD and sends it to the ICC using the INTERNAL AUTHENTICATE command.
  
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<br>2) The ICC performs the following operations:
  
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<br>a) Create the header.
  
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<br>b) Generate M1.
  
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<br>c) Calculate h(M)
  
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<br>d) Create the trailer
  
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<br>e) Calculate the message representative F.
  
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<br>f) Compute the signature 3 and send the response to the IFD.
  
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<br>3) The IFD verifies the response on the send INTERNAL AUTHENTICATE command and checks if the ICC returned the correct value.
  
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===Security of the ePassport infrastructure===
  
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* [http://rowlandwatkins.com/past/2008/8/8/on_exploiting_epassport_vulnerabilities/ On Exploiting ePassport Vulnerabilities] (about PKI)
  
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* [http://www.dexlab.nl/ So what’s the issue with ePassport security?]
  
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* [http://www.cs.auckland.ac.nz/~pgut001/pubs/pass_faq.html Hello, my name is ...]
  
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* [https://www.os3.nl/2008-2009/epassport_eng E-passport security]
  
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* [http://www.cs.ru.nl/E.Poll/papers/nluug.pdf Fingerprinting passports] via their non-standard error codes
  
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====US Passport Card====
  
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Don't mix US Passport Book (ICAO) with the [http://travel.state.gov/passport/ppt_card/ppt_card_3926.html US Passport Card] (see also [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Passport_card wikipedia]), valid when entering the United States from Canada, Mexico, the Caribbean and Bermuda at land border crossings
  
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or sea ports-of-entry and [http://www.theregister.co.uk/2009/02/02/low_cost_rfid_cloner/ skimmed much more easily].
  
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[http://travel.state.gov/passport/ppt_card/ppt_card_3921.html Won’t this chip violate Americans’ privacy?]
  
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<i>There will be no personal information written on the electronic chip itself. The chip will have only a unique number pointing to a stored record contained in secure government databases.[...] In addition, to mitigate any possibility that the card could be tracked, it will be issued with a protective sleeve that will prevent the card from being read when not in use.</i>
  
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===Tools===
  
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====[http://openmrtd.org/ OpenMRTD]====
  
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library
  
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====[http://jmrtd.org/ JMRTD]====
  
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Java host API & Javacard applet to build your own epassport infrastructure
  
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====RFIDIOt====
  
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See [[RFID#RFIDIOt]]
  
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====[http://www.dexlab.nl/ eCL0WN]====
  
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Applet for Nokia NFC phone
  
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====[http://freeworld.thc.org/thc-epassport/ vonJeek emulator]====
  
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==Misc==
  
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* [http://www.smartcardfocus.com/shop/ilp/se~37/p/index.shtml Protective sleeves & wallets] shielding RFID stuff like ePassports
  

Revision as of 00:40, 4 February 2009

Back to Belgian eGov

Belgian ePassports

See also the general ePassport page

Characteristics

  • Current versions demo
  • Uses Opentrust PKI (former IDX-PKI from idealx)
  • Price:
    • 30€ droit de chancellerie
    • taxes communales (Ixelles=26€, Leuven=11€?,...)
    • 41€ frais de confection
    • Much more expensive if urgent or 64 pages (~250€)
  • maker? at least not Zetes (contradictory info here)
    Mais nous ne fabriquons pas le passeport belge, c’est vrai. C’est un contrat qui a été attribué avant que nous ne soyons actifs sur ce segment. S’il y a un appel d’offres, j’imagine que nous y répondrons.

chip

  • ATR 3B 8E 80 01 80 91 E1 31 C0 64 77 E3 03 00 83 82 90 00 6C
  • ATR 3B 8E 80 01 80 91 91 31 C0 64 77 E3 03 00 83 82 90 00 1C (as mentioned in pcsc-lite smartcard_list.txt)
  • ATR 3B 88 80 01 00 00 01 07 01 72 90 00 EC (on a recent passport 01/2009 EH431xxx)
  • Belgium is one rare country to also include the owner handwritten signature, in EF_DG7
  • Non-compliances?
    • Requires option 0x0C whenever you select the application or a file (important for non-BAC passports), usually other passports implement 7816-4 a bit better and accept the standard select_file but apparently Belgium just implemented the example of LDS just as it was presented, no more)
    • non-BAC passports have a bug in EF_DG11, in full name of holder (tag 5F0E): null length followed by "A0 06 02 01 01"
    • newer passports have a bug in EF_DG12, using tag 5F85 instead of 5F55 for the document issuance timestamp (5F85 is in LDS1.7, 5F55 is in ISO standard)
    • newest passports (with polycarbonate transparent sheet) don't have the bug anymore in EF_DG12, skipping simply document issuance timestamp
  • Reading the DS certificate in EF_SOD (output truncated):
openssl pkcs7 -text -print_certs -in EF_SOD.PEM
Authority:
       Issuer: C=BE, O=Kingdom of Belgium, OU=Federal Public Service Foreign Affairs Belgium, CN=CSCAPKI_BE
       Subject: C=BE, O=Kingdom of Belgium, OU=Federal Public Service Foreign Affairs Belgium, CN=DSPKI_BE
       X509v3 extensions:
           X509v3 Authority Key Identifier:.
               keyid:00:84:19:14:B2:CE:7E:0A:DE:3A:26:F9:FD:DD:1F:F4:01:42:A8:0E

Security of Belgian ePassports

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