Belgian eGov
Revision as of 17:05, 22 January 2009 by <bdi>PhilippeTeuwen</bdi> (talk | contribs) (→RFID-enabled Passports)
Links
- BELgian Governement Interoperability Framework
- eGovernment in Belgium, EU report (2005) by IDABC
- eGovernment factsheet - Belgium v.10.0 by IDABC
eID
cf Belgian eID
RFID-enabled Passports
Readers
Hacks
- http://www.acbm.com/inedits/rfid.html
- http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2006/06/build_your_own.html
Tools
Belgian ePassports
Characteristics
- Current versions demo
- Uses Opentrust PKI (former IDX-PKI from idealx)
Security of Belgian ePassports
- http://www.theregister.co.uk/2007/06/10/belgian_epassport_flaws/
- http://www.dice.ucl.ac.be/crypto/passport/index.html
Electronic voting
Misc
- Dan Wallach's Homepage
- Hacking NEDAP Voting-Computers at Hack.lu 2006
- Irish commission on electronic voting
Schaerbeek incident
- Electronic Voting Random Spontaneous Bit Inversion
- RAPPORT CONCERNANT LES ÉLECTIONS DU 18 MAI 2003
- Zoé GENOT (Ecolo) communique sa question orale au Parlement
- Cosmic ray hits Brussels election -- really? (RISKS-23.46)
- Cosmic rays and bit flips
SIS card
$ pcsc_scan Reader 0: iDream ID-SMID01 00 00 Card state: Card inserted, ATR: 92 23 10 91 ATR: 92 23 10 91 + TS = 92 --> UNDEFINED + T0 = 23, Y(1): 0010, K: 3 (historical bytes) TB(1) = 10 --> Programming Param P: 16 Volts, I: 0 milliamperes + Historical bytes: 91 ERROR! ATR is truncated: 2 byte(s) is/are missing Category indicator byte: 91 (proprietary format) Your card is not a microprocessor card. It seems to be memory card.
This requires actually a reader capable of the 3-wire protocol.
Card as identified by a OmniKey 5321 reader:
Siemens SLE4418/28 (Infineon) 1k
It's 1024-byte memory, with a mask to tell which bytes can be changed and probably (if SLE4428) a "password" of 2 bytes, self-locking after 8 failed attempts.
Note that SLE4418/28 are discontinued by Infineon, proposing now compatible cards SLE5518/28