Difference between revisions of "EPassport"

Revision as of 01:36, 4 February 2009

RFID-enabled Passports

ICAO standards

Certificates

CSCA certificate (Country Signing CA certificate)
- is typically valid for their period of intended use + period of validity of the issued passports + 3 months (e.g. 5+10+0.25) and renewed after their period of intended use (e.g. 5 years).
- is used to verify the DS certificate
DS certificate (Document Signer certificate)
- is typically valid for the period of validity of the passport itself + 3 months and renewed after their period of intended use (3 months). (e.g. 10+0.25)
- is used to verify the integrity of the EF_DG* files of the passport through their hashes signed in EF_SOD
- is optionally present in the EF_SOD file of the passport (mandated by US-VISIT & by EU I think)
SOD (Document Security Object)
- RFC3369 CMS Signed Data Structure, signed by the Document Signer (DS).
- Carries the hashed LDS Data Groups.
- Stored in the MRTD’s chip.
- MAY carry the Document Signer Certificate
AA (Active Authentication) keys
- private key stored in the chip
- public key available in EF_DG15, whom hash key is signed in SOD by DS

As per epassport2008 there are several certificates for the full EAC solution:

Element                              File name
CSCA certificate - name              NN_CSCA.der (.der, .cer)
DS certificate                       NN_DS (.der, .cer) preferably included in the ePassport chip
CVCA certificate                     NN_CVCA.cvcert (minimal validity at least 2 month)
CVCA private key under PKCS#8 format NN_CVCA.pkcs8
DV certificate                       NN_DVCA.cvcert (effective date like CVCA certificate)
IS certificate                       NN_IS.cvcert (effective date like CVCA certificate)
IS private key under PKCS#8 format   NN_IS.pkcs8

CSCA certificates

Stupid script to see what are the country certificates there (there are also CRLs):

#!/bin/bash 

rm xx*
csplit pkd.000033.ldif '%userCertif%' '/^userCertif/' '{*}'
for i in xx*; do
    cat $i |sed '1s/^.*:://;/:/,/qwerty/d' |openssl base64 -d|openssl x509 -inform der -out $i.pem -outform pem
    cat $i |sed '1s/^.*:://;/:/,/qwerty/d' |openssl base64 -d|openssl x509 -inform der -text -noout > $i.txt
    test $? -eq 0 && rm $i
done

Verifying a passport

Example to verify a French passport:

# Get France CSCA certificate: hum you should get country certificates from a trusted source ;-)
$ wget -O - http://jmrtd.org/csca/fr.cer |openssl x509 -inform  der -outform pem -out fr.PEM
# EF_SOD certificate should have been extracted by RFIDIOt, if not:
$ tail -c+5 EF_SOD.BIN | openssl pkcs7 -inform DER -outform PEM -out EF_SOD.PEM
# Verify DS certificate stored in the passport with country CSCA certificate:
$ openssl pkcs7 -in EF_SOD.PEM -print_certs -outform PEM |openssl verify -CAfile fr.PEM
stdin: OK
# Verify SOD is well signed by DS, how?
$ openssl smime -verify -in EF_SOD.PEM -inform pem -noverify > EF_SOD.data
Verification successful
# Note that the 2 previous steps can be combined in one:
$ openssl smime -verify -in EF_SOD.PEM -inform pem -CAfile fr.PEM > EF_SOD.data
Verification successful
# Verify files hashes are those signed in SOD

# Active authentication, verify the passport owns the private key of cert in DG15, how?

Moreover to be perfect, we should also check CSCA and DS against CRLs supposedly available at ICAO PKD.

Active Authentication

from http://www.aph.gov.au/Senate/committee/legcon_ctte/estimates/add_0506/ag/qon_91att_2.pdf
A4.2. Active Authentication Mechanism
Active Authentication is performed using the ISO7816 INTERAL AUTHENTICATE command. The input is a nonce (RND.IFD) that MUST be 8 bytes. The ICC computes a signature, when an integer factorization based mechanism is used, according to ISO9796-2 Digital Signature scheme 1 ([R17], ISO/IEC 9796-2, Information Technology – Security Techniques – Digital Signature Schemes giving message recovery – Part 2: Integer factorisation based mechanisms, 2002.).
M MUST consist of M1 and M2, where M1 MUST be a nonce of length c – 4 bits and M2 is RND.IFD.
The trailer option 1 MUST be used in case of SHA-1, if not SHA-1 then option 2 MUST be used.
The result of the signature computation MUST be signature 3 without the non-recoverable message part M2.
In more detail, IFD (inspection system) and ICC (MRTD’s chip) perform the following steps:
1) The IFD generates a nonce RND.IFD and sends it to the ICC using the INTERNAL AUTHENTICATE command.
2) The ICC performs the following operations:
a) Create the header.
b) Generate M1.
c) Calculate h(M)
d) Create the trailer
e) Calculate the message representative F.
f) Compute the signature 3 and send the response to the IFD.
3) The IFD verifies the response on the send INTERNAL AUTHENTICATE command and checks if the ICC returned the correct value.

Dumping the public key of the passport:

tail -c+4 EF_DG15.BIN |openssl rsa -pubin -inform der -text

Security of the ePassport infrastructure

On Exploiting ePassport Vulnerabilities (about PKI)
So what’s the issue with ePassport security?
Hello, my name is ...
E-passport security
Fingerprinting passports via their non-standard error codes

US Passport Card

Don't mix US Passport Book (ICAO) with the US Passport Card (see also wikipedia), valid when entering the United States from Canada, Mexico, the Caribbean and Bermuda at land border crossings or sea ports-of-entry and skimmed much more easily. Won’t this chip violate Americans’ privacy? There will be no personal information written on the electronic chip itself. The chip will have only a unique number pointing to a stored record contained in secure government databases.[...] In addition, to mitigate any possibility that the card could be tracked, it will be issued with a protective sleeve that will prevent the card from being read when not in use.

Tools

OpenMRTD

library

JMRTD

Java host API & Javacard applet to build your own epassport infrastructure

RFIDIOt

See RFID#RFIDIOt

eCL0WN

Applet for Nokia NFC phone

vonJeek emulator

Misc

Protective sleeves & wallets shielding RFID stuff like ePassports

Specific countries

Belgian ePassport