Belgian ePassport

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Belgian ePassports

Characteristics

• Current versions demo
• Uses Opentrust PKI (former IDX-PKI from idealx)
• Price:
  • 30€ droit de chancellerie
  • taxes communales (Ixelles=26€, Leuven=11€?,...)
  • 41€ frais de confection
  • Much more expensive if urgent or 64 pages (~250€)
• maker? at least not Zetes (contradictory info here)
  Mais nous ne fabriquons pas le passeport belge, c’est vrai. C’est un contrat qui a été attribué avant que nous ne soyons actifs sur ce segment. S’il y a un appel d’offres, j’imagine que nous y répondrons.

chip

• ATR 3B 8E 80 01 80 91 E1 31 C0 64 77 E3 03 00 83 82 90 00 6C
• ATR 3B 8E 80 01 80 91 91 31 C0 64 77 E3 03 00 83 82 90 00 1C (as mentioned in pcsc-lite smartcard_list.txt)
• Belgium is one rare country to also include the owner handwritten signature, in EF_DG7
• Non-compliances?
  • Requires option 0x0C whenever you select the application or a file (important for non-BAC passports), usually other passports implement 7816-4 a bit better and accept the standard select_file but apparently Belgium just implemented the example of LDS just as it was presented, no more)
  • non-BAC passports have a bug in EF_DG11, in full name of holder (tag 5F0E): null length followed by "A0 06 02 01 01"
  • newer passports have a bug in EF_DG12, using tag 5F85 instead of 5F55 for the document issuance timestamp (5F85 is in LDS1.7, 5F55 is in ISO standard)
• Reading the DS certificate in EF_SOD (output truncated):

openssl pkcs7 -text -print_certs -in EF_SOD.PEM
Authority:
       Issuer: C=BE, O=Kingdom of Belgium, OU=Federal Public Service Foreign Affairs Belgium, CN=CSCAPKI_BE
       Subject: C=BE, O=Kingdom of Belgium, OU=Federal Public Service Foreign Affairs Belgium, CN=DSPKI_BE
       X509v3 extensions:
           X509v3 Authority Key Identifier:.
               keyid:00:84:19:14:B2:CE:7E:0A:DE:3A:26:F9:FD:DD:1F:F4:01:42:A8:0E

Security of Belgian ePassports

• http://www.theregister.co.uk/2007/06/10/belgian_epassport_flaws/
• http://www.dice.ucl.ac.be/crypto/passport/index.html

RFID-enabled Passports

ICAO standards

• ICAO MRTD
• ICAO9303-pt1-vol1.pdf
  • html
• ICAO9303-pt1-vol2.pdf
  • html
• ICAO9303-pt3.pdf
  • html
• Supplement to ICAO Doc 9303 - Release_7
• LDS 1.7

Country certificates

• see http://jmrtd.org/csca.shtml
• ICAO PKD
• ICAO PKD LDIF download

Stupid script to see what are the country certificates there (there are also CRLs):

#!/bin/bash 

rm xx*
csplit pkd.000033.ldif '%userCertif%' '/^userCertif/' '{*}'
for i in xx*; do
    cat $i |sed '1s/^.*:://;/:/,/qwerty/d' |openssl base64 -d|openssl x509 -inform der -out $i.pem -outform pem
    cat $i |sed '1s/^.*:://;/:/,/qwerty/d' |openssl base64 -d|openssl x509 -inform der -text -noout > $i.txt
    test $? -eq 0 && rm $i
done

As per epassport2008 there are several certificates for the full EAC solution:

Element                              File name
CSCA certificate - name              NN_CSCA.der (.der, .cer)
DS certificate                       NN_DS (.der, .cer) preferably included in the ePassport chip
CVCA certificate                     NN_CVCA.cvcert (minimal validity at least 2 month)
CVCA private key under PKCS#8 format NN_CVCA.pkcs8
DV certificate                       NN_DVCA.cvcert (effective date like CVCA certificate)
IS certificate                       NN_IS.cvcert (effective date like CVCA certificate)
IS private key under PKCS#8 format   NN_IS.pkcs8

Security of the ePassport infrastructure

• On Exploiting ePassport Vulnerabilities (about PKI)
• So what’s the issue with ePassport security?
• Hello, my name is ...
• E-passport security
• Fingerprinting passports via their non-standard error codes

Tools

OpenMRTD

library

JMRTD

Java host API & Javacard applet to build your own epassport infrastructure

RFIDIOt

See RFID

eCL0WN

Applet for Nokia NFC phone

Misc

• Protective sleeves & wallets shielding RFID stuff like ePassports